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Municipal Finance in India: Some
Critical Issues

Simanti Bandyopadhyay1
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Abstract
With the help of the available literature, the paper attempts to assess critically the main problems
of municipal finances in India and to bring out the challenges that the municipalities face with
respect to revenue generation and expenditure management. The main findings suggest that the
urban local bodies in India are confronted with lack of proper decentralization of functions and
finances, inadequate revenue generation, expenditure shortfalls leading to poor service delivery.
It also analyses the suggestions and recommendations that have been offered in the literature to
cope with these critical challenges relating to urban finance.
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Introduction
About 377 million Indians comprising about 31 per cent of the country’s population live in urban
areas, with an average annual addition of 8 million (Census 2011). As far as the proportion of
urban population is concerned, India is behind the other emerging economies like China (45 per
cent), Indonesia (54 per cent), Mexico (78 per cent) or Brazil (87 per cent) but is closer to Burma
(34 per cent) and Guinea (35 per cent). The share of persons living in urban areas in India rose
by 3.4 per cent in the decade 2001 to 2011 while it had risen by only 2.1 per cent in the decade
1991 to 2001. Recent projections show that by 2031, about 600 million Indians will reside in
urban areas, an increase of over 200 million in just 20 years (Twelfth Five Year Plan) If we rank
the cities in the world by population, Mumbai and Delhi are among the top ten and Kolkata
among the top 15 (if population density is the criterion for ranking) all these three Indian
megacities are among the top 6 cities in the world (World Urbanization Prospects, 2011
revision, online data UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs).
Estimates by the Central Statistical Organisation, available for a few years, indicate that the share
of the urban sector in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of India increased from 38 per cent in
1970–71 to 52 per cent in 2004–05. The mid-term appraisal of the Eleventh Five Year Plan
projected the urban share of GDP at 62–63 per cent in 2009–10, which is at present around two
thirds of the GDP and it is likely to become 75 per cent in 2021 (India 2008).
There is a concentration of the urban population in large cities and existing urban
agglomerations. As per census 2011, there are 53 million plus cities accounting for about 43 per
cent of India’s urban population. Also, the increase in the number of towns in India from 5,161
in 2001 to 7,935 in 2011 can be primarily attributed to the growth of small towns around
agglomerations. A recent study by the World Bank also shows that the peri-urban areas in the
vicinity of large cities are centres of intense economic activities (India Urbanisation Review:
Urbanisation beyond Municipalities 2012). In the Twelfth Five Year Plan, there is a shift of
focus in policies with equal importance on small and big towns rather than concentrating on big
cities.
A look at the key indicators of the major urban services reveals that there is a failure to achieve
even moderate success in service delivery. 70.6 per cent of the urban population has individual
water connection with duration of water supply ranging between one to six hours a day. Most
Indian cities do not have water metering system for residential establishments. Non revenue
water accounts for 50 per cent of water production. Even partial sewerage network is not there in
4,861 cities. 13 per cent of urban households do not have any form of latrine, less than 20 per
cent of the road network is covered by storm water drainage, scientific disposal of solid waste is
not there in most of the cities (Twelfth Five Year Plan).
The Report of High Powered Expert Committee (HPEC) for Estimating the Investment
Requirements for Urban Infrastructure Services estimates Rs 3.92 million crores as the
investment needs to provide urban services conforming to national benchmarks for urban
infrastructure over a period 2012-31.The operations and maintenance costs would amount to
another Rs.2 million crores (Ahluwalia HPEC 2011).

Municipal Finance in India: Some Critical Issues

3

Municipal revenues constitute a minimal share in India’s GDP. The Eleventh and Twelfth
Finance Commissions data show that the ratio was around 0.7 per cent which according to
Thirteenth Finance Commission has gone up to 0.94 per cent in 2007-08.The share of municipal
revenues in combined state and central revenues have declined from 3.71 per cent in 1990-91 to
2.43 per cent in 2000-01(Mohanty et al 2007). Thirteenth finance Commission data reflects that
the municipal tax to GDP ratio is a meager 0.5 per cent as compared to central tax to GDP ratio
at 12 per cent and states’ tax to GDP ratio at 5.6 per cent for 2007-08, while Property tax to GDP
ratio is only 0.25 per cent.
The problem of financing infrastructure needs in the Indian cities becomes more relevant in the
context of inclusive growth because there is a considerable dependence of the rural sector on
urban development. With the urban sector contributing an overwhelming share of growth, an
overall sustained growth for the economy places a lot more demand on the performance of the
cities (Twelfth Five Year Plan). The efficiency in financial management is the main driver of
performance of the cities. In what follows we attempt a detailed literature review on the
problems and prospects of urban finances in India.
Urban Finance in India: Summary Findings
Own revenues, consisting of tax (of which the property tax is a major source) and non tax
revenues declined to 53 percent of the total revenues of Municipalities in India in 2007-08 from
63 per cent in 2002-03 (Twelfth Five Year Plan). The rest is accounted for by grants, assignment
and devolution by State Governments, grants from Central Government and Finance
Commissions. Various ways of augmenting the resources of the municipal bodies in the country,
including essential reforms in the property tax system and adequate exploitation of user charges
and fees for various services delivered as well as ways of strengthening and improving central
and state transfers to urban local governments, are explored in Rao and Bird (2010, 2011). With
respect to financing urban infrastructure, judicious use of development charges and effective
collections from public lands are recommended in general. In addition, development of the
municipal bond market is also advocated for financing capital expenditures. Similar
recommendations are made in the Twelfth Five Year Plan. The Twelfth Five Year Plan proposes
that charges should be levied on the additional floor space index (FSI) provided. Further, the
charges on the additional FSI and the land-use conversions should be at last 50 per cent of the
actual land value of the area in question. Also, the Twelfth Five Year Plan proposes that apart
from the revenues collected from the FSI, urban local bodies (ULBs) collect other “land value
based instruments” like development charges, betterment fees etc.
In what follows we would summarise the literature on different sources of municipal revenues in
India. In the absence of a Municipal Finance List, we attempt to collect the different tax and non
tax sources from Municipal Acts which are listed in section 1 and 2 of the Appendix. We start
with property tax which, being identified as a major source of own revenues, has been the main
subject of research on urban finance in India. We also cover studies on other taxes, non tax
components and user charges. The issues related to intergovernmental transfers and role of
Finance Commissions are also discussed in the light of the available literature. Some issues
related to municipal borrowing from different sources are also covered.
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Property Tax
Studies on property tax focus on a few crucial areas in India like assessment methodology,
coverage of properties, collection efficiency and amending the rent control laws to overcome
assessment constraints. Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JnNURM) and
Urban Infrastructure Development Scheme for Small and Medium Towns (UIDSSMT) gave a lot
of emphasis on property tax reforms, particularly the assessment component, stressing upon
mapping of properties using the Geographic Information System (GIS), making the system
capable of self-assessment, rationalizing exemptions and improve collections to about 85 per
cent. As a consequence of this, research and evaluation studies are undertaken assessing the
impact of property tax reforms on municipal finances in India. However, even after the first
phase of JnNURM is over, the results are not satisfactory (Twelfth Five Year Plan).The main
recommendations include improved methods of property tax assessment, accompanied by
appropriate administrative reforms. The property surveys and usage of GIS technology should
happen as a complete package to ensure full coverage of the properties. Computerization of
property taxes, regular revision of rates, more user friendly tax system and making tax
enforcement a priority are also proposed.
Assessment of properties is one of the biggest challenges for the ULBs which are plagued with
issues like unscientific methods, lack of transparency and issues with incomplete records of
properties. There are no formal and standard practices for having the property counts. Apart,
from these there are also political interests that prevent the collection of the property taxes
leading to low collection efficiency (Gnyaneswar 2009).
The ULBs in India are in different stages of implementation of reforms in valuation of properties
ranging between purely Annual Rental Value and Capital Value based on unit area
characteristics. There are ULBs who apply a hybrid method of rental valuation based on location
and characteristics of the building, and tax is calculated on the basis of this rental value. A
review of property tax reforms (National Institute of Urban Affairs (NIUA), 2010) on the basis
of 10 selected cities viz. Ahmedabad, Bangalore, Bhubaneswar, Chennai, Hyderabad, Indore,
Kolkata, Ludhiana, Patna and Pune shows that cities like Patna, Indore, Chennai, Hyderabad,
Bangalore and Ahmedabad have already moved to the “unit area assessment system” while
Kolkata and Bhubaneswar are yet to implement the unit area system (although the municipal
laws have been amended). Patna and Ludhiana have continued with the system of Annual
Ratable Value (ARV). Out of these 10 cities, 6 cities have a collection efficiency of property
taxes of more than 70 per cent. Bangalore has experienced a sharp rise in the property tax
revenues after moving to the unit area based approach, while Ahmedabad has benefitted through
technical advancements like usage of the GIS system which led to the highest number of
assessed properties per 1,000 population.
Legal framework plays a prominent role in realizing the gains from a transformation in the
valuation methods. Gnaneshwar (2009) in his study based on municipal corporations from
Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka established that the gains in Karnataka from moving
to a self assessment property tax system has been the maximum because of the fact that in
Karnataka, the reform has been executed with a revision in the legal framework whereas in the
other two states the existing legal provisions were used. There also have been substantive efforts
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on the part of the Government of India (GOI) to bind the states for introducing the reforms by
taking e-governance initiative.
Madon et al (2004) looks at the Bangalore City Corporation’s (BCC) initiative to reform its
property tax system and the interaction between the “local contingencies” and “external
influences” in implementing such reforms. Although in nominal terms, property tax revenues
have grown by 10.4 per cent from 1988-1994-95, the inflation adjusted figures reflect stagnation.
The authors claim that despite there being many initiatives to have better implementation of the
property taxes, benefits were only realized when the Self Assessment System was started. The
study finds that despite facing constraints in terms of “institutional capacity”, the BCC was still
able to implement the self assessment system. The feat was achieved by its efforts to mobilize
various local and global actors who had diverse interests. The paper emphasizes on the building
of such networks.
The administrative aspects to implement reforms in property tax are very important to get desired
results. On the basis of a study on Andhra Pradesh, Mohanty (2003) finds that although tax
reforms and strategy depends on the “pre conditions” certain factors like close involvement of
the tax paper, tax-service linkage, incentives for filing of tax returns, disincentives for non-filing,
tax education are very important. The study claims that although it is useful to have uniform slab
rates for homogeneous properties, it can be regressive in case of heterogeneous properties.
“Correction of inequities” in the tax system could be very useful and could enhance revenues. A
greater focus on “compliance” brought in a lot of revenues for Hyderabad.
The fiscal and distributional implications of the existing and the possible future assessment
reforms in property tax are worth exploring in the context of Indian cities. Lall and Deichmann
(2006) throws some light on the issue for two states Karnataka and Maharashtra, with Bangalore
and Pune as the study sample, The authors find that the reforms that get the property tax base
closer to the market value have significant and positive implications for revenue generation.
Also, these reforms do not have any negative implications for the poor. However, although these
reforms are good as a first step intended towards greater efficiency of the property taxes,
structural issues like improved valuation, increasing the buoyancy of the taxes etc still need to be
looked at. Unless structural issues are resolved, improvements in the administration will do only
little to make the property tax a useful revenue option. The paper finds that in Pune and
Bangalore where the tax assessment gets linked to the “market rental or capital values”, have a
very high prospect of augmenting the revenues from property taxes. In fact, in Pune the use of
market value is seen to have “redistributive impacts” with lower taxes in areas where services are
poorer. Also, the authors find that a one-time move to an area based system from the previous
rental-value based system expanded Bangalore’s revenues from property taxes by about 62 per
cent. If “market rents” were adopted (i.e from an area based approach to market rent approach),
then revenues earned from Pune would rise by about 55 per cent while for Bangalore the gains
would be about 33 per cent. While studies like Mohanty et al (2007) and various reforms agenda
prescribes changing over to valuation based on unit area characteristics, there is a view which
challenges the faith in the market based valuation system in India as there is no clear cut
definition of a “market value” which might harm the tax yields (Mathur et al 2009).
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A recent paper (Bandyopadhyay 2013b) compares the implementation of the property tax
reforms in two major metropolitan cities in India, Delhi and Bangalore. Both the cities have
implemented the property tax reforms and have shifted to the unit area method of assessment.
However, while property tax collection rose for Bangalore after the implementation of the
reforms, Delhi experienced a fall in the number of properties assessed and property tax collection
after the implementation of the reforms. Further, property tax to GSDP ratio also increased for
Bangalore while it fell for Delhi. The paper finds that policy as well as administrative factors
was responsible for such contrasting outcomes. Better structuring of the tax rates, better coverage
and collection efficiencies achieved through better tax administration, better service delivery and
a relatively more stable property market (in Bangalore compared to Delhi), were found to be the
major reasons as to why property tax reforms succeeded in Bangalore while they failed in Delhi.
The issue of progressivity is also discussed briefly. After the shift to the unit area method, most
areas have a progressive rate structure of property taxes, barring some places who still have a flat
rate (like Ludhiana) (Rao 2013). Author (2013b) also points out that a comparatively more
progressive rate in Delhi after the unit area method was implemented is also responsible for loss
of revenues in Delhi.
As far as revenues from property tax is concerned, there are large variations in Indian Cities. In a
study of 35 large corporations, Mathur (2009) finds that there are large inter-city variations with
the Mumbai municipal corporation having per capita revenue of Rs.1,334 while the Patna and
Dhanbad municipal corporation had only Rs.25 and Rs.40. However, the study does claim that
population size has a strong impact on property tax collection (with a correlation of 0.82). The
total tax demand over the study period has shown some signs of stagnation reflecting limited
inclusion of new properties and revision of rates. However, variables like growth of state’s GDP
or the ratio of state’s tax to GDP have little impact on property taxes. A comparative study of
urban finances in Jharkhand and West Bengal finds that per capita property tax in Jharkhand is
much lower than in West Bengal (Bandyopadhyay 2011).Bandyopadhyay (2012) indicates to a
wide variation in property tax collections in the ULBs within the state of Karnataka. As far as the
relation with size of a city is concerned, there is no unique pattern which can be cited from the
literature.
Collection Efficiency of property tax is low in Indian cities which is one of the reasons for low
collections of property tax (Mohanty et al 2007, Bandyopadhyay and Rao 2009, Rao and Bird
2011). A study on 36 million plus cities in India finds that the average collection rate was only
37 per cent. Higher collection rates are found in Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, and Andhra
Pradesh. Bihar and Madhya Pradesh have very low collection efficiencies as is the case with
Delhi. Corporations of Gujarat and Maharashtra though have higher per capita collections have
lower collection efficiency (Mathur et al 2009). For Karnataka, the overall average collection
efficiency of property taxes is 62 per cent, with the collection efficiency being the lowest in the
smallest size class and the highest (65 per cent) in the medium size class cities (with a population
of 25000-50000) with little variation across cities (Bandyopadhyay 2012).
Apart from the usually discussed problems of limited coverage, poor collection efficiency,
problems with valuations, Rao (2013) stresses on the exemptions given to various properties. He
cites the case of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi and observes that exemptions made to the
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lavish buildings of the bureaucrats were a major reason behind the failure of MCD’s efforts to
reform property taxes.
Octroi
Octroi has been an important source of revenues in Indian cities. The Report of the Committee
on Octroi (1985) constituted by the Ministry of Urban Development recommended that it should
be replaced by local taxes. The alternatives include surcharge on sales tax, entry tax, terminal
tax, road tax, motor vehicles tax, etc. All the states, except Maharashtra, have abolished this local
tax because of its distortionary nature. In Maharashtra it is still levied in Corporations. Octroi
was abolished in different phases in different states of India and for the cities levying Octroi, it
has been the most important source. In most of the cases, it has a higher share than property tax
(NIUA 2010, Pethe and Lalvani 2011, Bandyopadhyay and Rao 2009, NIPFP 2007c).
After the abolition of octroi the main issue is the compensation of Octroi which has been tough
for most of the state governments. In fact in Maharashtra one of the reasons why the
Corporations still continue to levy octroi is the failure of the state to design a compensation
scheme. For example in the city of Mumbai, half the revenues come from Octroi and the amount
of octroi received is equivalent to the entire state’s excise income which is very difficult to be
compensated. Apart from the alternatives mentioned above, local value added tax (VAT), local
business tax, professions tax have also been prescribed but faced political resistance on grounds
of inter-jurisdictional disparities. However, progress on the implementation of compensatory
mechanisms of Octroi in India is not satisfactory.
Other Tax, Non tax and User charges
The non tax revenue collections from cities account for only 0.13 per cent of GDP in India. (Rao
and Bird 2011).Non tax and taxes other than the property tax have been neglected as potential
revenue sources in Indian cities so far. According to Pethe and Lalvani (2011), in Maharashtra,
water charges, license fee, entertainment tax are still an “untapped potential”. Although we find
that the shares of these components are quite high in many of the cities, no systematic study has
been conducted to estimate the potential for these components. The shares of non-tax and tax
revenues are almost same, with non-tax revenues having slightly a higher share in the own
revenues in the cities of Karnataka (Bandyopadhyay 2012). Non tax revenues have dominated
the own revenue collections in Jharkhand and are distributed quite evenly across the population
size classes. However, the per capita non tax revenue in West Bengal is about four times as high
as in Jharkhand (Bandyopadhyay 2011). The importance of other tax and non tax revenues are
also indicated in Rao and Bandyopadhyay (2009), Considerable potential in non tax revenues in
all the five major agglomerations are conceived. In the study based on five urban agglomerations
viz Delhi, Kolkata, Chennai, Pune, Hyderabad, it was found that for bigger Corporations the
shares of non tax revenues in total revenues have a range between 9 to 64 per cent. For smaller
cities this variation ranges between 22 to 47 per cent
Even with a considerable share of non tax revenues, and huge untapped potentials in different
classes of cities, very little attention has been paid to this component of revenues. There are
methodological challenges in estimating the non tax base. Multiplicity of rates and
heterogeneous base of non tax revenues are some of the major sources of problems. In most
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municipal laws provisions exist for levy of rents/charges for use of shop, stalls, slaughterhouses,
burning ghats etc. In Karnataka there are also provisions for charges on public halting places,
cart stands, cattle sheds. public bath houses etc. Wherever transport and electricity are provided
by municipality, provisions exist for levying charges on the same. In certain cases, a distinction
is made for residential and for non residential areas. However most of the items in the provision
for tax (other than property tax) and non tax revenues listed are not actually levied by many of
the cities in India (Sections 1 and 2, Appendix).
Mohanty et al (2007) recommends that a “‘Municipal Finance Schedule’ for assignment to the
ULBs to match the list of functions included in the 12th Schedule. This list would include
property tax including vacant land tax and taxation of Central and State Government properties
(or service charges in lieu thereof), professional tax, entertainment tax, advertisement tax,
business licensing fee or tax, motor vehicle tax or a share from the same, planning permission
fee, development impact fee, betterment levy, a surcharge on stamp duty on registration deeds or
a share from it and a proportion of the Value Added Tax. Transfer of a proportion of Value
Added Tax has also been proposed in Bandyopadhyay and Rao (2009). The report of the High
Powered Expert Committee (HPEC, 2011) also recommends having a Municipal list and
transferring a share of goods and services tax (GST) to the local bodies.
One of the important components of non tax revenue is user charge which deserves special
mention. User charges are still a recent phenomenon and there are not too many enabling
provisions in the municipal laws. In Maharashtra, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh, there is a
provision for levying charges on water and sewerage rather than taxes on these, Mohanty et al
(2007) finds that although Mumbai, Surat and Pune are some of the best performing
corporations, they underutilize user charges and hence cost recovery is below 25 per cent.
User charges act as signals of the scarcity value to consumers (Bird and Rao, 2011). User
charges are useful to the extent that they help in bringing about “efficiency” in revenue
collection for the municipalities, helps in “rationing” of services and most importantly help the
municipalities with more funds to work with. When it comes to levying a tax or a charge on a
particular service, there are mainly two principles-the “ability to pay principle” and the “benefit
principle”. The “ability to pay” principle works on the theory that people who have more, should
contribute more. On the other hand, the “benefit principle” refers to the theory whereby higher
contributions are made by people who enjoy the services more than the others. “User charges”
work on the “benefit principle”.
The primary task in determining the pricing strategy is to determine the costs of the service in
question. This involves estimating: a) the cost of a particular service; b) the cost of general
public services in a locality and c) the general overheads of that municipality. The costs for a
given service would vary across municipalities but certain portions (the fixed elements) do not
fluctuate too much. Location also impacts costs. Also, the section of the society that the service
is catering to has to be kept in mind while estimating costs and then setting up the user charges.
For example, if the rich choose to stay away from the city, they should bear the heavy costs of
pumping water. But if the poor live in the outskirts due to the urban housing being unaffordable,
then it would be unfair to put the burden of charges on them. Further, the authorities also need to
analyze if they want to include the capital costs while setting up the user charges. In certain
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cases, capital costs are funded by the general public revenues, capital grants etc, while the public
pays for the operation and maintenance (O&M) costs. After costs have been ascertained, the
feasibility of recovery of such costs is checked. For this, the nature of benefits accruing to the
public and the extent of excludability of the service is seen. For example, if the benefit of a
service is very direct and private, then the consumer would bear almost the entire costs of
provision of such services.
After the costs have been ascertained, the best suited tariff scheme has to be selected. The range
of tariff schemes includes flat rate tariff, unit rate charging, variable block pricing, seasonal rate
schedule, marginal cost pricing, average cost pricing, two part tariff etc. While choosing a tariff
scheme the criteria kept in mind are those of adequacy, fairness, simplicity etc.
User charges and the required hikes in them for cost recovery are likely to face strong resistance
initially, but over time people appreciate such moves once the better service delivery from these
revenues are realized. In Amravati though people initially opposed the hike in the water tariffs,
24X7 water supply has ensured that they pay the tariffs regularly (Ahluwalia 2012a). Also,
proper user charges based on accurate meters (with proper billing procedures) can be beneficial
for consumers. For example, the pilot project in Karnataka showed that with meters, people were
paying lesser (with a consumption based payment system in place), than the fixed rate system in
the absence of meters (Ahluwalia 2010).
Empirical evidence, though inadequate, shows that cost recovery in Indian cities is quite low.
According to Mohanty et al (2007) 10 large corporations in their sample could recover less than
10 per cent of the cost of providing services through fees. In the other six corporations cost
recovery was around 10 to 20 per cent. Only in 2 out of 25 corporations in the sample, cost
recovery was more than 75 per cent.
Measures to augment local revenues, particularly user charges and non tax components), are
evaluated in Bandyopadhyay and Bagchi (2013) with the case of Municipal Corporation of
Delhi, the capital city of India. Introduction of congestion and conservancy charges and revision
of rates for existing parking fees, one time parking charges, fees from mobile towers and
property taxes were recommended but could not be implemented due to political and social
resistance. Through a simulation based analysis, the authors find that with the implementation of
these recommendations, increases in the own revenues could range between 10 per cent and 21
per cent while total revenue increases could range between 7 per cent and 15 per cent. The
authors also find that own revenues would be able to cover about 77 per cent to 85 per cent of the
revenue expenditure and total revenues would be able to account for about 74 per cent to 80 per
cent of the total expenditure. Major share of gains would come from ‘one time parking charges’
followed by property taxes and other components.
Own Revenue Potential
Estimating the revenue capacity is very important to assess the financial strength of cities. There
are methodological challenges as well as constraints in data for these estimations in Indian cities
(National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (NIPFP) 2007 a,b,c,2008 a,b).However, studies
have attempted to provide empirical estimations of underutilization of revenue potentials.
Bandyopadhyay and Rao (2009) in their study on five major agglomerations in India viz.
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Kolkata, Delhi, Chennai, Pune and Hyderabad which constitutes 15 per cent of India’s total
urban population finds that all the agglomerations have unutilized potential for revenue
generation. The potential for the central cities of the agglomerations are estimated to be 79 per
cent more than the actual while the smaller ULBs in the agglomerations are estimated to have 25
per cent more. Author (2011) estimates the total revenue potential for ULBs in the state of
Jharkhand to be 77 per cent more than what is actually generated in the ULBs of the state.
Mathur et al, (2009) aims at estimating the property tax potential in India and also suggests the
measures to tap that potential. The study estimates property tax revenues from 36 million plus
cities (which accounts for about 35 per cent of the total population) in India. The study estimates
property taxes to be somewhat around 0.16 per cent-0.24 per cent of GDP. The main
recommendations suggest broadening of the tax base, establishment of the Central Valuation
Board, indexation of property tax values, improving the collection efficiency by setting up a
mechanism that helps to identify tax evasion and use of guidance values in assessing property
values. The study pointed out that there remains huge untapped revenues on account of property
tax in the country and to improve the situation, states should focus on improving coverage and
collection efficiency. Property tax revenues could increase to an extent of three times as high as
the present collections by bringing all cities to an 85 per cent coverage level from an average
coverage ratio of 56 per cent and 85 per cent collection efficiency from an average collection
efficiency of 37 per cent.
Transfers
Transfers consist of shared taxes between the municipality and the state government and grants
from upper tiers of the government. Shared taxes are revenues based on Tax Assignment Rules.
Entertainment Tax, Motor Vehicles tax, Stamp Duty/Surcharge are some of the common shared
revenue sources which are not uniform across states. On an average, almost half of the total
revenues of the cities come from transfers. While grants are more important sources for smaller
cities, for bigger corporations, the proportion of shared taxes are higher (Bandyopadhyay and
Rao 2009). Another study (NIUA 2011) reports that 66 per cent of the revenues for the ULBs of
Bhopal, Ujjain, Bhubaneswar and Puri came from “non plan transfers”. However, ULBs of
Ahmadabad and Rajkot were fairly “self sufficient” while dependence on state funds has
increased for Guwahati.
After 74th Constitutional Amendment, the 10th, 11th and 12 th finance commissions provided “adhoc grants” to the ULBs of India. However, the 13th finance commission made provisions for a
“devolution package” whereby the grants would be now linked to the central revenues. Also, the
13th finance commission had introduced the “performance based grants”. There were also other
features like the proper budgeting, having a better system of proper administration at the local
body level, having an electronic transfer system at the local body level etc. However, the ULBs
have a long way to go in trying to exploit the performance based grants as these need certain
conditions to be fulfilled (like empowering all ULBs to levy property taxes without any
exemptions, having a State Property tax Board which would assist the ULBs in assessing
property tax, having a Local Body Ombudsman who would look after complaint being addressed
etc) and there is a need for proper guidance to the ULBs for the fulfillment of these conditions.
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The grants provided by the Central Finance Commission (CFC) were mostly conditional and
heavily relied upon the utilization certificates furnished by the ULBs. The State Finance
Commission (SFC) grants were more unconditional in nature and were to be used for regular
expenses. There have been delays in setting up of the SFCs and other administrative delays like
delays in submitting reports to the SFCs, delays in submission of the Action Taken Report. Nonavailability of data is a constraint in the selected states (Madhya Pradesh (M.P), Gujrat, Tamil
Nadu Orissa and Assam) and consequently surveys were required for collecting data (NIUA
2011). Further, the systems of grant in aid in the selected states were quite diverse in terms of the
“non-plan transfers”. For example, in certain cases the octroi compensation was considered as a
part of the SFC’s devolution package while others kept it outside the SFC’s grants. For Gujrat
the share of the SFC grants in the “non-plan transfers” were low while there were about 30 types
of specific purpose grants. Apart from the CFC and the SFC grants, there are other grants that are
received by the ULBs from the upper tiers. However, in some states SFC funds were released
without having the utilization certificates from the previous years (NIUA 2011).
Performance of the SFCs and the devolution of the powers to the ULBs are related. The
Constitutional amendment provides that the SFCs should recommend on issues like distribution
of the net proceeds from taxes, duties etc. between the state and the local bodies, the
determination of taxes, tolls, duties, fees that could be assigned to the ULBs, the grant-in aid and
the measures required to improve the financial position of the ULBs. Although the mandates are
fairly broad, most states have struggled to provide the required guidance. However, Kerala and
Tamil Nadu have mandated their SFCs to explore “the potential for borrowing by the ULBs,
develop the criteria for sharing of costs of assets and institutions transferred to ULBs, and
provide guidance for more effective local financial management and accountability as well as
state incentives that can support higher local resource mobilization”. There is this belief that the
SFCs have not been able to play the “leadership role” in supporting decentralization. The report
of the HPEC (2011) recommends in line of the Thirteenth Finance Commission to strengthen the
SFCs by improving their capacity.
However, Mathur and Peterson (2006) find that in certain cases the SFCs’ recommendations
have not been heard by the state governments and if at all they have been heard, implementation
has been poor. Also, despite the 74th Amendment providing for transfer of functions to the
ULBs, they have only happened in a very limited manner and no proper “mechanism” has been
put in place whereby the developing authorities and the ULBs can coordinate the future
development activities of the cities. Further, the SFCs have failed to recommend the required
changes in the fiscal powers of the ULBs but have emphasized a lot on the revenue sharing
arrangements between the state and the ULBs by estimating what the ULBs would gain from the
shared revenues and how much would they need to spend for even the minimum level of service
delivery. Finally, the paper recommends setting up a workshop for assessing the SFC’s reforms,
undertaking an analysis for better structuring of the grant-in-aid, modernizing states’ resource
gap analysis etc.
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Municipal Borrowing
Borrowing is considered to be a practical option for financing large infrastructure projects (Rao
and Bird, 2011). Municipal borrowing is mainly confined to public institutions like Life
Insurance Corporation of India (LIC) and Housing and Urban Development Corporation Limited
(HUDCO).
Market based borrowing is not very common in Indian cities. Tamil Nadu provides a good
example. The Tamil Nadu government has actively been involved in implementing the Tamil
Nadu Urban Development Project since 1988. The International Development Agency (IDA) of
World Bank was the main financer of this project and the Municipal Urban Development Fund
(MUDF) was an important component of this fund. The MUDF performed well and its scope
was broadened to have some private participation. This led to the formation of the Tamil Nadu
Urban Development Fund (TNUDF) in 1996 under the Indian Trust Act. The MUDF was
converted with the state government’s contribution of around 72 per cent and private players’
(like Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India (ICICI), Housing Development
Finance Corporation (HDFC) etc) pooled in funds to have a contribution of about 28 per cent to
create the TNUDF. Tamil Nadu Urban Infrastructure Trustee Company Limited (TNUITCL)
manages TNUDF while Tamil Nadu Urban Infrastructure Financial Services Limited
(TNUIFSL) is the fund manager.
TNUDF uses mainly three lines of credit-world bank, Japan International Cooperation Agency
(JICA) and Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW). They specify how much they would provide
in terms of loans and how much in terms of grants. These lines of credit finance a part of the
project while the remaining amount can come from the state government or through market
borrowings. Funding agencies provide funds to the GOI which are then transferred to the Tamil
Nadu (TN) government. The TN government can transfer these as loans (by TNUDF) or by
grants (these are capital grants where a part of the grant may also come from the international
donors).
However, funds to the ULBs can also be made available through the Special Purpose Vehicles
(SPVs). The Water and Sanitation Pooled Fund (WSPF) is an example of such SPVs. This was
created as a debt fund through issuing bonds. These were unsecured in nature and were issued
for 15 years. The funds were raised by TNUIFSL. The proceeds were given to the ULBs.
Although they were unsecured bonds, there were certain guarantees that were provided. Firstly,
the ULBs needed to contribute to an escrow account through their revenue sources. Secondly, a
separate fund was kept aside by the state for repayment known as the Debt Service Reserve Fund
(DSRF). Thirdly, U.S Agency for International Development (USAID) guaranteed for 50 per
cent of the total amount to be paid as principal and interest and the remaining part would be paid
by the state government (by repaying the shortfall through the Bond Service Reserve Fund and
deducting this amount from the respective ULB’s share in the funds from the State Finance
Commission). Also, the TNUIFSL would monitor the whole process and ensure timely
repayment of the dues to the investors.
The TNUDF are used for a range of purposes for urban development, mainly focusing on urban
infrastructure. TNUDF also aims at private participation in urban infrastructure, improving the
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finance management of ULBs enabling them to access markets and having grant funds for
addressing urban poverty. The borrowers can be the ULBs or private institutions that provide for
urban infrastructure and the eligibility criteria are well defined. Strong emphasis on escrow funds
etc ensure timely repayment of borrowings leading to almost full repayment of loans.
An elaborate discussion on the evolution of municipal bond market in India is given in Vaidya
and Vaidya (2010). Since 1994, the Indo-US Financial Institution Reform and Expansion
(FIRE_D) project has been actively working towards developing an active bond based finances
for the ULBs which has enabled the local ULBs to mobilize funds worth more than Rs12
million. This started with the taxable municipal bonds with the Ahmadabad Municipal
Corporation (AMC) issuing bonds of Rs. 1000 million for financing a water and sewerage
project of Rs. 4390 million. AMC was partially helped by its earlier steps towards improving its
efficiency through better tax collection measures, having computerized accounting systems etcwhich in a way did some groundwork before the bond financing. These initiatives helped the
AMC to have a cash surplus of Rs. 2,140 million by March 1999, from a deficit earlier.
Following AMC’s example other cities (Nashik, Nagpur, Ludhiana and Madurai) have also
floated such bonds. A remarkable feature of these bonds has been that they were not backed by
any kind of guarantee by the state. (State guaranteed bonds were first issued by the Bangalore
Municipal Corporation in 1997) However, the subscription depended largely on credit ratings
and ULBs had to prove that they had sound financial positions with a strong revenue base, high
collection efficiency etc.
Next came the tax free municipal bonds. The GOI had constantly been trying to give tax
concessions on bond interests but that met with limited success. So, in 1999-00, the then Finance
Minister announced that ULBs can float tax free bonds and in 2000 the central government
amended the Income Tax Act (vide the Finance Act 2000) whereby the interest earned from
bonds would be entirely tax free. The AMC was the first municipality to float these tax free
bonds in April 2002, where bonds were issued for Rs.1000 million for water and sewerage
projects.
However, access to capital markets is fairly limited for smaller local bodies. Also, there is a high
transaction cost in accessing the capital markets. This led to the pooled finance system whereby
small ULBs pooled in resources and then issued bonds. The first initiative in this line was
WSFPF in 2002-03 where 14 municipalities came together and floated bonds worth Rs.304
million and was backed by the credit enhancement system where the state and USAID
guaranteed repayment. This was followed by the Government of Karnataka’s initiative whereby
eight municipalities came together and floated bonds worth Rs 1,000 million in 2005. The fund
was called Karnataka Water and Sanitation Pooled Fund (KWSPF) and was supported by
USAID guarantee.
Looking at the success of the pooled finance system in Tamil Nadu and Karnataka, the Pooled
Finance Development Fund (PFDF) guidelines were introduced by the GOI and the FIRE-D
project so that the ULBs could access the market funds for creation of urban infrastructure and
also undertake the required reforms to create efficient urban centers. The JNNURM, a flagship
urban investment program of GOI encourages ULBs to link the projects with market-based
financing. Also, the Central Finance Commission (CFC) along with the support of the State
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Finance Commission is supposed to provide important recommendations on how to augment the
resource base of the municipalities. One of such important recommendations came from the 13th
CFC report where the grants would be linked to the “divisible pool” rather than the “ad-hoc
grants” provided earlier. Also, although the total grants would be increased by four-times, part of
the grant would be linked to the performance of the municipalities.
Expenditure Management and Fiscal Gaps
Karnataka was the first to have a system of measuring and monitoring of the urban services by
setting up the Municipal Reform Cell (MRC) in 2004. This was the first initiative by any state
government to introduce service level benchmarking. The main feature of this was the use of
information technology(IT) for monitoring and governance with fundamental administrative
reforms at the local government level (Ahluwalia 2012b). Subsequently, the Ministry of Urban
Development also came up with Service Level Benchmarking framework. Once the extent of
adequacy of services in physical terms is determined, expenditure requirements on them can be
analysed.
Composition of expenditures is not uniform across Indian cities. Also, expenditure per se does
not mean much unless we can assess the extent of misuse component in it. Pethe and Lalvani
(2011) finds that corporations in Maharashtra are more inclined towards the “core service” than
on the local public goods, with a 39 per cent share of core services in the total expenditure in
1999-00. The highest expenditure component has been “general administration”, pensions etc,
although the trend has seen a decline. On the other categories, the expenditure on education has
declined while the expenditure on public health has remained at about 5 per cent for some time.
According to Bandyopadhyay (2012) bigger cities in Karnataka have higher proportions of O&M
expenditures while both salary and establishment components show higher proportions in
smaller cities. This indicates that bigger cities are incurring more productive expenses than the
smaller ones. We find that the ULBs on an average can reduce 27 per cent of their expenditures
on O&M, labor and establishment to provide the same levels of services provided currently by
them. The study also finds that there can be additional savings particularly on establishment and
labor expenditures to operate at the maximum efficiency levels. Further the paper finds that the
extent of problem of unproductive spending and under-provision of services is more pronounced
in smaller cities.
Estimations of expenditure requirements are useful to guide the cities in expenditure
management. Fiscal gaps measured as the difference between the expenditure needs and revenue
capacities can act as the indicators to quantify transfers from upper tiers of the government. The
daunting data requirements and methodological challenges restrict the number of studies in this
area.
There have been some attempts to assess the adequacy of municipal finances to provide services
conforming to norms. Comparisons of actual expenditures on a particular service with the
financial norm for that service can give an idea on the extent of under-spending. Taking Zakaria
Committee norms, which was determined in the 1960s, a study for the period 1999-2000 to
2003-04 shows that in 30 municipal corporations in India, on an average, actual spending is only
about 24 percent of the requirements, or the extent of under-spending is as high as 76 percent
(Mohanty et.al, 2007). The study also shows that of the 30 municipal corporations, the extent of
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under-spending was over 75 percent in 17 municipal corporations, and over 50 percent in all of
them except in three which are Pune (31.6 percent), Nagpur (30.8 percent) and Nasik (35.5
percent). Patna Municipal Corporation actually spends only about 5.6 percent of the requirement
and the shortfall was 90 percent in almost all municipal corporations in UP and Bihar. The study
also attempts to establish a direct relation between cost recovery ratio and extent of underspending. It was found that in their sample the cities with better cost recovery rate are the ones
with lesser extent of under-spending on services. A higher cost recovery in user charges can help
the cities to fulfill their expenditure requirements. Another study on the urban local bodies of
Jharkhand (Bandyopadhyay 2011) based on Ramanathan and Dasgupta (2009) norms estimates
that the actual revenue expenditures can cover only 41 per cent of the revenue expenditures
requirements. Actual capital expenditures can cover 3 per cent of the capital expenditure
requirements on urban services. Bandyopadhyay (2012) shows that comparing the services in a
particular size class of city with the norms suggested by HPEC report (2011), in the smaller
cities in Karnataka, it is water supply which has the minimum shortfall from norms, in the
medium sized cities it is road density which is closest to the norms and in the largest city size
class it is the solid waste management which performs the best with zero shortfall from norms.
On an average for all the services there is a shortage of 57 per cent of the O&M expenditure
norms, the shortage being the highest (64 per cent) in the biggest size class of cities.
Comparison of the growth of expenditures with that of revenues can give an idea about how the
city can cope up with growing needs. If we compare the growth of revenues with expenditure,
generally growth in the latter is higher than the former. Mathur et al (2009) finds that revenue
productivity of the property taxes is low, with a growth rate much below the growth rate of
expenditure.
Another way of looking at the adequacy of revenues is by comparison of the revenues (or the
potential estimates, if available) with expenditures (or the requirements). According to Mathur et
al (2009) property taxes can only fund about 28 per cent of the revenue expenditure.
Bandyopadhyay (2012) finds that for the cities in Karnataka, only 27.5 per cent of the O&M
expenditure requirements can be fulfilled by the own revenues once the potential for the latter is
fully realised. This proportion is higher in bigger cities with moderately high variation across
cities. As far as the O&M cost coverage is concerned the paper finds that on an average the
ULBs in Karnataka can finance 50 per cent of the O&M costs on basic services through their
own revenues with a very high variation in the proportions across cites.
Bandyopadhyay and Rao (2009) estimates the fiscal gaps for five major agglomerations in India.
The main findings suggest that, except for five small urban local bodies in Hyderabad, the others
are not in a position to cover their expenditure needs by their present revenue collections. All the
agglomerations have unutilized potential for revenue generation; however, with the exception of
Hyderabad, they would fail to cover their expenditure needs even if they realize their revenue
potential. Excepting Chennai, larger corporations are more constrained than smaller urban local
bodies.
The main problem in assessing the fiscal health of Indian cities is the absence of a rigorous
methodology in estimating expenditure needs and revenue capacity. Bandyopadhyay(2013a)
considers big urban agglomerations and smaller cities in India to propose a two stage
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methodology which explains the variations in fiscal health across cities. In the first stage the
expenditure need and revenue capacities are estimated. In the second stage an econometric
analysis is attempted to identify the determinants of fiscal health. The nature of relationship
between the determinants and the fiscal health indicator is defined by the relative strength of the
'revenue effect' and the 'expenditure effect'. We find that the role of the higher tiers of the
government is important in bigger and smaller cities in their financial management. For bigger
cities, own revenues can also play an important role in improving fiscal health. In smaller cities
the role of the demand indicators is not that prominent but the cost indicators are found to be
more effective while in case of bigger agglomerations, the demand indicators can play a role.
Conclusions
This paper has attempted to review the state of municipal finance in India. With the help of the
available literature, we find a wide diversity in the functions and thus revenue handles of cities.
The extent of decetralisation is not uniform across states. The compositions of revenues are
diverse, with differing trends in the growth patterns of revenues. Expenditures in general fall
short of their requirements. Most of the cities generate revenues much lower that their potentials.
Assignments of revenues are not uniform, nor are grants transferred in the same way on the same
heads. The size of the city is an important factor in explaining these differences, but we are yet to
have any unique relation between size of the city and their quality of management from
empirical literature. The stage of the development in which the city is in, whether it is a part of
an agglomeration or has an independent identity also affects the performance.
Performance in revenue generation and expenditure management is at the core of
competitiveness for a city. A good performance in municipal resource management could be the
key to attract educated mass which in turn can bring about more revenues to the city. Given the
industrial performance of the city, population growth, employability, a good performance in
municipal resource utilization and management can bring about a huge change in the city.
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Appendix
Section 1: Tax Sources in Indian Cities from Municipal Acts
1.
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19.
20.

Property tax
Profession tax
Sanitation/ Conservancy Tax
Scavenging tax
Latrine tax
Drainage tax
Education tax
Entry/Terminal tax
Taxes on vehicles
Advertisement tax
Entertainment tax
Pilgrim tax
Environment tax/Land Revenue
Betterment/Development tax
Passengers & Goods Tax
Timber tax
Tax/toll on animals
Cable Operator Tax
Toll/Tax on bridges/Vehicles
Octroi

Section 2 Non Tax Sources /Use Charges in Indian Cities from Municipal Acts
1. Sanitation/ Conservancy Charge
2. Water charges
3. Surcharge on Sales Tax
4. Birth/Death Registration fees
5. Betterment fees
6. Mutation fees
7. Dangerous and Offensive Trade License Fees
8. Slaughter house fees
9. Market fee
10. Fee for fire services
11. Fees on dogs
12. Fees for Registration of animals etc.
13. Parking fees
14. Fee on building application
15. Duty on transfer of immovable property
16. Penalty for late tax payment
17. Stamp Duty
18. Rent from Municipal Properties
19. Receipts from Fines
20. Receipts from Interest
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